Information Asymmetry and Moral Hazard in AI-Mediated Commerce: A Principal-Agent Analysis
Abstract
In agentic commerce, a profound schism emerges between human intention and algorithmic execution. Consumers may express preferences, but the final purchasing decision is often executed by an AI agent. This paper analyzes this dynamic through the established lens of principal-agent theory, framing the human user as the principal and the AI as the agent. We introduce the term "Shopper Schism" to describe the unique manifestation of agency problems—specifically information asymmetry and moral hazard—that arise in this context. Drawing on emerging empirical research and illustrative mini-case studies of systems like Amazon's "Subscribe & Save," we explore how consumer choice is mediated and potentially redirected by algorithms. The paper contributes by extending agency theory to the novel domain of autonomous, non-human commercial agents. We conclude with managerial implications for designing trustworthy AI systems and a call for further research into the economic and behavioral impacts of delegated digital consumption.
Keywords: Agentic Commerce, The Great Decoupling, Disintermediation, Algorithmic Shopper, Principal-Agent Theory, Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Brand Loyalty, Market Structure, AI Strategy